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Fali Nariman*
Mr. President, Mr. Under-Secretary-General, my colleagues
on the panel, ladies and gentlemen: Many of you will recall the
Twentieth Biennial Conference of the International Bar Associa-
tion, held in Vienna, in September 1984. You may remember
that in his opening address, the then President of Austria, Herr
Kirschlager, said that the extent of freedom which a lawyer is
guaranteed by his country's laws and of which he can actually
avail himself in his day-to-day practice, faithfully reflects the free-
dom enjoyed by each individual in that country. This was a sig-
nificant remark - the extent of a citizen's freedom in the State
is measured by the extent of the lawyer's freedom within that
State to practice his profession. It was a reflection of the grow-
ing consciousness about the responsibility of the modern lawyer
to the public he or she is meant to serve.
It was not always so. Two centuries before, in a place not far
from Vienna, Frederick William I, the soldier King of Prussia,
had decreed that lawyers in his kingdom should wear their offi-
cial black gowns always wherever they went, so that, "the rogues
can be recognized from afar and people may be aware of them."
When I related this recently to a friend, he rather unkindly
said, "ah, now I know why they called him Frederick the Great!"
But there has been a vast transformation in the public percep-
tion about the role and utility of lawyers since the time of the
Prussian King.
The most memorable contributor to this change in percep-
tion was the great democrat Edmund Burke. It was he who
spoke about lawyers who "augur misgovernment at a distance,
and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze."1
I like to believe that it is in recognition of this uncanny qual-
ity, of "sniffing the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze,"
* President, Bar Association of India; Chairman, International Commission of Ju-
rists.
1. Edmond Burke, Second Speech on Conciliation with America. The Thirteen
Resolutions (Mar. 22, 1775).
542 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:541
that the General Assembly of the United Nations, whilst endors-
ing unanimously, in December 1990, the Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers,2 took care to stress the importance of the legal
profession's responsibility in protecting human rights and fun-
damental freedoms recognized by national and international
law.
The fundamental freedoms recognized by national and in-
ternational law has grown, over the last half century into what
has come to be known by the compendious expression "Interna-
tional Human Rights Law." Fifty years ago, there was no such
law in existence, and there were very few human rights norms.
In fact, the term "international law" itself did not exist in
ancient times, nor even in the Middle Ages. The expression
owes its existence to a Dutch Lawyer, Hugo Grotius, whose work
on the Law of War and the Law of Peace in 1625' became the
foundation of a systematized body of rules of universal applica-
tion.
By reason of the well-entrenched doctrine of State sover-
eignty, ever since 1625, one proposition remained unchallenged
for more than three centuries: That international law, or the
Law of Nations as it was then called, did not recognize rights of
any individual against any sovereign State.
In the nineteenth century, it was again a lawyer, John Aus-
tin, in his then-famous (but now almost unreadable) Lectures on
Jurisprudence,4 who provided a theoretical basis, a legal rationale,
for the doctrine of State sovereignty.
Austin defined law as a body of rules for human conduct set
and enforced by a sovereign political authority. It followed from
this definition that the law of nations could not be called "law"
since international law was a body of rules governing relations of
sovereign States between one another, and there was no sover-
eign political authority above sovereign States which could en-
force such rules.
The Austinian theory of sovereignty was eagerly seized upon
by autocratic and despotic regimes. Individuals were regarded
only as symbolic representatives, as capital assets of their States.
2. G.A. Res. 121, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/conf.144/2b (1990).
3. HUGO GROTIUS, GROTIUS ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN ABRIDGED
TRANSLATION (1853).
4. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1875).
1997] INT HUMAN RIGHTS & SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES 543
Sovereign States were at liberty to treat their citizens as they
liked; they were beyond the reach of international law.
It was World War II, and the Holocaust (where six million
people were killed), which became the catalyst for new develop-
ments. In August 1945, with the dropping of the atom bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, came the prospect of a different kind
of holocaust - the beginning of the end of humankind.
The entire theoretical basis of international law trans-
formed because it now had to adapt itself to a new world order.
Bad times, with the possibility of worse times to come, make for
fertile and innovative legal thinking. Legal thinking was never
more prolific nor more productive than in the immediate after-
math of the end of World War II.
The United Nations Charter of 1945 signified recognition,
for the first time in an international treaty, of a wide generality
of rights for individuals. A major achievement of those who
drafted it - and many of them were lawyers - was the emphasis
on the importance of social justice and human rights as the
foundation of a suitable international order. The Charter im-
posed legal obligations not only upon Member States of the
United Nations, but upon the United Nations as a whole. Article
55(c) laid down that the United Nations shall promote "univer-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. . . ."
Then, in 1946, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
broke new ground. It recognized, also for the first time, that
victims of crimes against humanity committed even by their own
governments were entitled to the protection of international
criminal law.
About a year later, in 1948, Member States agreed at an In-
ternational Convention that genocide (acts committed with the
intent to destroy in whole or in part, national, ethnic, racial, or
religious groups) would be punishable on trial by national courts
or by an International Criminal Tribunal.6
In just five years since the end of the World War II, the indi-
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c) (discussing principles of international economic and
social cooperation).
6. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) (declaring criminality of genocide under international law).
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vidual citizen of a State had become a subject of concern to in-
ternational law.
In 1950, a great lawyer and jurist Hersh Lauterpacht (later a
judge of the International Court of Justice) wrote in felicitous
prose, "[t]he individual has now acquired a status and a stature
which have transformed him from an object of international
compassion into a subject of international right."7
Lauterpacht was one of the pioneers of what came to be
known as the "Modern View" of international law, which was that
States, though still primarily the subject of international law,
were not exclusively so. He got the opportunity of widely dissem-
inating this view when editing the first volume of the 8th Edition
of Oppenheim's classic treatise on International Law, published
in 1955.8
The 1945 post-World War II United Nations Charter, the
1946 judgment at Nuremberg,9 the 1948 Genocide Conven-
tion," and the December 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,11 were determined bids to shake off the doctrine of "Ab-
solute State Sovereignty." The legal theory of sovereignty now
stood modified, in two crucial aspects. First, how a State treated
its own subjects had now become the legitimate concern of inter-
national law; and second, a superior international standard, es-
tablished by common consent, could now be used for judging
domestic law, and also for judging the actual conduct of a sover-
eign State within its own territory, and in the exercise of its inter-
nal jurisdiction.
During the past fifty years, there has been a sustained effort
at the United Nations to set superior international standards. At
the center of this endeavor stands the system of human rights
treaties, legally binding norms that apply to all ratifying States.
To a large extent, the standards are in place, and broad legal
responsibility by Member States has been assumed. Human
rights instraments, international and regional, have proliferated.
7. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950).
8. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (1992).
9. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/236
(1947).
10. See supra note 6.
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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They now run into a thousand pages in print. But the value of
all these instruments rests on their continued recognition by a
large number of States. They are accepted as "declaratory of
broadly accepted human rights norms" within the international
community.
Probably at no other time in the history of human kind have
more people believed that they are entitled to the enjoyment of
human rights than today, which incidentally, is a tribute to the
power of words and the ideas conveyed by them. Words do have
an impact and help shape events. I recall the eloquent speech
made by Jose Diokno at a meeting of the Law Association for
Asia and the Pacific ("LAWASIA") in 1979 in Sri Lanka. He was
the noted Philippine human rights activist. President
Jayawardene was present on that occasion, and Desmond Fer-
nando later told me thatJayawardene was most impressed. After
this, he never again said that human rights was a Western con-
cept. In the following year, in 1980, Sri Lanka ratified the
ICCPR,1 2 principally due, it is widely believed, to the impact of
Diokno's speech.
The role of judges, national and international, is critical to
an understanding, and to the advancement, of modern interna-
tional human rights jurisprudence. It lies not so much in what
judges say, but in what judges do in the cases that come before
them. As the celebrated Justice Holmes once said, "[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."13
It was a widely recognized rule of international law and
practice that individuals had no standing to challenge a violation
of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sover-
eign State involved. This rule had survived the legal documenta-
tion of the post-1945 period, and was firmly established by deci-
sions of national courts, first in Israel in the Eichmann case, in
1962,14 and then in the U.S. in the Noriega case, in 1990.15 These
cases held that rights under international common law belong
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (reaffirming obligation of Member States under U.N. Charter to promote
universal respect for human rights and freedoms).
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law (1897).
14. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. Dist. Ct. -Jerusalem 1961), affd,
36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962).
15. US. v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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only to the Sovereigns, not to individuals, and this statement of
the law was approved in all leading textbooks right down to
1994.
But no longer. In a judgment delivered, in October 1995,
in the case of Prosecutor v. Tadi,16 the International Criminal Tri-
bunal at the Hague, trying cases of crime against humanity in
the former Yugoslavia, has held that even the State's sovereign
power to establish its own courts for punishment of crimes com-
mitted within its own territory must give way in the face of of-
fences that "do not affect the interest of one State alone but
shock the conscience of mankind."17
Where a conflict had both internal and international as-
pects, then, regardless of the type of conflict, an International
Tribunal set up by the Security Council had jurisdiction and au-
thority to adjudicate offenses committed by a citizen of a State,
even though the offenses were general criminal offenses, like
murder and rape, committed within the territory of the State.
As to the judgment in the Eichmann case and in the Noriega
case - that individuals in a State had no right to challenge viola-
tions of international treaties to which the State was a party-the
President of the Court brushed aside these decisions in a single
sentence. He explained that pronouncements of this kind do
not carry in the field of international law the weight they may
bring to bear in national judiciaries.
In January 1985, whilst accepting on behalf of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists ("ICJ") the award to that body of
the Wateler Peace Prize, my good and wise friend Nial
MacDermott, then Secretary General of the ICJ, explained that
lawyers did not serve mankind well when they formulated the
concept, or rather, the fiction of the sovereign nation State. He
further elaborated that the great obstacle to peace is the im-
mense concentration of power in the nation State especially
when fed by fanatical nationalism; and the task before us is to
find ways to diffuse that power.
Fortunately, ways are being found. It is somewhat paradoxi-
16. Prosecutor v. Dudko Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, reprinted in, 35 I.L.M. 32
(1996) (denying Tadi's appeal based on illegal foundation of International Criminal
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), wrongful primacy of ICTY over national
courts, and lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae).
17. Tadi, 35 I.L.M. at 51 (discounting Tadi's argument that ICTY is unlawfully
usurping national court's power).
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cal that the once-impregnable walls of the sovereign State, so
carefully constructed by the jurists of the nineteenth century, are
now being dismantled by the innovative and ingenious tech-
niques of the jurists of the twentieth century.
But, the omnipresent ogre of State sovereignty still looms
large. Much remains to be done.
The great violators of the most basic human right, the right
to peace, are sovereign governments obsessed with national se-
curity. Although we do have an impressive body of international
law, with scores of international covenants and conventions, in
the end they do not add up to much.
Whenever a sovereign State chooses to be a law unto itself,
there is simply no effective power to stop it, particularly if it has,
and is known to have, a sufficient arsenal of weapons. Although
the threat of a universal war has been contained, sporadic re-
gional warfare is far too frequent, reaching new depths of sav-
agery. The civilian population is attacked and decimated by
powerful groups within a State, at times with the use of chemical
weapons, outlawed way back in 1925, under the Geneva Conven-
tion. 18
The sovereignty of the State, as opposed to the concept of
the comity of nations, continues to be the single gravest threat to
the human right to world peace, and there is no sustained and
dedicated effort to make the peoples of the world aware of this
important fact.
Mere reduction of the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons is
not enough. The Chairman of the Communist Party of China
made this point in an interview with Time Magazine some years
ago. When asked to comment on the proposal between the then
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") and the United
States to reduce their nuclear armory by fifty percent, he went
on record to say, "[when each has the power to] destroy the
world ten times .... even if there is a fifty percent reduction
they still have the ability to destroy the world five times."19
Attempting to enforce disarmament is also not enough. We
18. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
19. An Interview with Deng Xiaoping; 'You should give them the power to make money.',
TIME, Nov. 4, 1985, at 39.
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lawyers must help create better legal structures for worldwide law
enforcement.
World peace is just not possible if we still hold fast to the
concept and practice of unlimited sovereignty of nations.
Throughout history, absolutely sovereign countries have proved
incapable of keeping the peace, since nationalism has always
been one step behind history. Some form of limited world gov-
ernment, with relinquishment of external sovereignty, is more
effective if the cataclysm is to be avoided.
Exactly fifty years ago, in the year 1947, Dr. Albert Einstein,
in a letter to the members of the Academy of Sciences of the
then USSR, gave his reasons for advocating limited world gov-
ernment. He wrote, "I advocate world government because I am
convinced that there is no other possible way of eliminating the
most terrible danger in which man has ever found himself. The
objective of avoiding total destruction must have priority over
any other objective."
About the same time, the other famous physicist, Dr. Robert
Oppenheim, the man who invented the atom bomb (and lived
to regret it), was called to testify before the U.S. Senate Award
Services Committee. He was asked the following question, "Doc-
tor, is there any defense against a nuclear weapon?" He
promptly replied, "Yes - PEACE."
Dr. Oppenheim knew, and after fifty years of freedom of
expression and an increasing dissemination of information, we
all know that there is no other defense.
In the preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO, one of the
agencies of the United Nations, there is a poignant sentence. It
reads, "[s] ince wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds
of men [and women] that the defenses of peace must be con-
structed."20
This, then, is the task for the lawyers of the twenty-first cen-
tury: to help build with their expertise better defenses for peace.
Universally, lawyers are privileged members of society. They
have access to, and often fill, positions of high authority in na-
tional and international bodies. Much is expected from them.
There is a beautiful passage in the New Testament which
reads, "[f] or unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be
20. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Nov. 16,
1945, T.I.A.S. 1580.
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much required: and whom men have committed much, of him
they will ask the more. '"21
On this fiftieth anniversary of the International Bar Associa-
tion, I would remind all its members to be prepared to respond
to these ancient words of wisdom.
Thank you very much.
21. Luke 12:48.
